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Abstract 
The mounting tide of foreign fighters leaving Britain for the Middle East to fight, 
sacrifice or find new lives has blighted European governments and led to the further 
tightening up of counter-terrorism measures.  Since the first British arrest of a Syrian 
returnee (Choudhury) in 2014, the latest figures of foreign fighter returnees have 
surged to approximately 800.  A number of strategies aimed at thwarting these 
trends have surfaced including a call upon Muslim parents to scrutinise their 
children’s attitudes and behaviour and to be watchful of their radicalisation.  Based 
on a study in the West Midlands (in the UK), the paper provides a snapshot of how 
Muslim parents have received calls upon them to report their actual or potentially 
radicalised children to the police. We argue that current practices are likely to be 
ineffective unless more democratic spaces are provided for free political expression. 
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Introduction 
The Paris and Brussels attacks bring fresh momentum to the question that has 
gripped Europe for many years – what to do with so-called ‘home-grown’ terrorists 
and the volunteers travelling to fight in conflict zones of Syria and Iraq? Amongst the 
punitive hard measures to contain and detain prospective and actual fighters are the 
softer approaches attempting to persuade parents of (would-be) jihadists, and 
Muslim communities generally, to dissuade their young from going and to report of 
any signs of radicalisation.  This paper explores the nature of these policies, set 
within the wider context of both counter-terrorism and the neoliberal welfare policies 
which place greater responsibility upon parents and communities when addressing 
social problems.  It examines the tentative effect of such measures in eliciting the 
desired support from Muslim parents and draws upon the findings of a small study 
based in the West Midlands. This study adopted a qualitative approach in gathering 
the perceptions of Muslim parents about whether they would inform the police if their 
children travelled to Syria. 
 Approximately 7,000 nationals of Western countries are believed to be fighting 
in conflict zones and out of the 800 believed to be from the UK, including young girls 
and families, 300 are thought to have returned (Home Office 2016; Soufan Group 
2016).  Given that the instigators of the Paris and Brussels attacks are thought to be 
linked with Syrian returnees the imperative for addressing the issue is given added 
momentum (Bakker, Paulussen, and Entenmann 2013). Fifteen foreign nationals 
were excluded from the UK in 2014 on grounds of ‘unacceptable behaviour’ and for 
not being ‘conducive to the public good’, including engagement in ‘hate speech’ and 
eleven terrorist organisations were proscribed (CONTEST 2014).   Making plans for, 
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or actual travel to Syria to join the Islamic State, have become an offence; many 
people have been arrested and charged for travel to Turkey, the assumption being 
that this is en route to Syria, from which attacks on British soil may be prepared 
(Gower 2015).  Moreover, ‘radicalisation’ has now become a child protection 
concern; there are twenty-eight care proceedings against families suspected of 
taking children to Syria. In the latest hearings parents have been threatened with 
imprisonment, removal of children (thirty-two children have been made wards of 
court and ten interim care orders issued in London) and electronic tagging (Family 
Court Orders 2015). These measures are a continuation of policies and legislation 
between 2006 and 2009, introduced after the 9/11 New York and the 7/7 London 
terrorist attacks, which saw the onset of securitization with several encroachments of 
human rights such as prolonged detention without trial, curtailing the right to remain 
silent and free speech (Bartlett and Miller 2012). 
The overarching Contest Strategy for countering terrorism was introduced in 
2005 with four wings serving distinctive purposes.  Whilst the Pursue, Prepare and 
Protect wings of the Strategy address intelligence and national security elements 
against terrorism. Prevent seeks to avert individuals from exposure to extremism and 
encourages the inculcation of British values; to ‘de-radicalise’ them where they are 
thought to be ‘at risk’ of radicalisation and extremism (defined respectively as a 
move towards extremism and vocally opposing British values and democratic ideals 
(HM Government 2011, 107-8).  Within this climate focus upon Muslim parents, in 
particular, to safeguard their children from radicalisation has intensified placing them 
under an increasing public gaze as parents. We argue that the strategies deployed 
to ‘engage’ Muslim parents in addressing the ‘problem’ of ‘radicalisation’ reflects both 
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approaches used with parents in other areas of social policy, and perpetuate the 
legacies of earlier colonial strategies (Borum 2011). We draw upon the findings of 
our study to argue that the success of harnessing support for counter-terrorism 
through parental involvement is uncertain due to concerns about trust between 
Muslim communities.    
A Suspect Community 
The notion that Muslims have replaced the Irish as a suspect community are widely 
acknowledged (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011; Hickman et al., 2012; Kundnani 2012; 
Breen-Smyth 2014).  Since 9/11, the Western representation of Muslims portrays 
them as ‘dangerous’, ‘risky’, ‘suspect’ and worthy of negative commentary.  Muslims 
are not targeted for having done wrongs or committing crime, but because they are 
Muslims – being suspect is a sociological, rather than a legal category (Raggazzi 
2016).  The counter-terrorism legislation and policy position a permanent gaze on 
the Muslim community, ranging from monitoring street activities, as witnessed by the 
police cameras placed in streets in Birmingham as part of Project Champion, or life 
in schools, as conveyed by the Birmingham Trojan Horse scandal and to life at home 
with regards to parenting skills as Muslim (and immigrant) parents are called upon to 
speak English in the home and report on the children, as well as criminalising them 
for engaging in forced marriages and female genital mutilation (Awan 2014).   The 
notion of the suspect community is thus heightened where it is both perceived to 
threaten violence, and is subject to its effects with increasing racism and vilification 
against Muslims (Breen-Smyth 2014). 
As noted above, Prevent and Channel programmes are the main platforms for 
monitoring ‘extremism’.  The strategies to monitor such trends are heavily reliant 
5 
 
upon psychological and networking discourses and assessments about what 
suspected individuals believe and with whom they associate (Crenshaw 1981).  The 
Channel programme, has received more than 2000 referrals since 2012 (HM 
Government 2015, 16), and the Prevent duty now imposes a duty upon frontline 
workers (teachers, social workers, health care professionals, etc.) to identify and 
refer ‘suspected victims’ of radicalisation and in doing so they are asked to probe 
into feelings of alienation, disillusionment from society, self-esteem, faith, identity, 
admiration of charismatic individuals, or the websites individuals may have accessed 
(DCSF, 2008: Youth Justice Board 2012, 22-3).  Recent examples of such detection 
and referrals include a four year old boy in a nursery who was threatened with a 
Channel referral when he talked about a ‘cooker bomb’ which turned out to be a 
reference to his father cutting a cucumber (Quinn 2016).  Hence, not only the 
detection and identification of radicalisation is questionable but evidence of its 
success is also lacking. 
With the emphasis on psychological ‘risk indicators’, ‘symptoms’ and patterns 
of behaviour and beliefs of individuals, rather than on socio-economic and political 
causes, these strategies have received much criticisms for their increasing 
surveillance, intrusion into privacy and for the pathologising and alienating effects on 
Muslim communities as well as for eroding democratic rights, liberties and 
participation (Hickman, et al, 2012, Kundnani 2012; Coppock and McGovern 2014; 
Breen-Smyth 2014; McGovern 2011; Ragazzi 2016).  As a suspect community, 
Muslim are demanded to show allegiance to British society;  Muslim parents are to 
be watchful of their children’s attitudes, their thoughts, beliefs and activities, clothes 
worn, language spoken and their use of the internet.  In a message delivered at 
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Birmingham Central Mosque in 2014 urging parents to help the police halt the tide of 
foreign fighters, Sue Southern, head of the West Midlands Counter Terrorism Unit, 
argued that the police could not help families once their loved ones had already left 
the country (Whitehead 2015).   Such exhortations to parents assume that there 
exists a relationship of trust between the police and parents.   However, such trust in 
some cases is scarce as highlighted by Nazir Afzal (ex-chief prosecutor for north-
west England) who argued that parents of ‘radicalised’ children were not going to the 
police; this is particularly the case since evidence points to policies that have 
resulted in an increase in stop and searches, a surge in Muslim prisoners and have 
left the community feeling criminalised and placed under heavy surveillance 
(Kundnani 2009; Awan 2012a).  
Regardless of their success or otherwise, a historical continuity can be 
observed between current and historical practices of governing subject and suspect 
communities.  Pressures on  immigrants (particularly Muslims) to speak English at 
home and efforts to inculcate British values, resonate with colonial practices where 
convinced of Western superiority Western culture and education were engrafted onto 
the suspect colonised (the then suspect community), as the British transformed 
Indian sub-continent ‘culture and society through the agencies of the English 
language and Christianity’ (Metcalf 1995 cited in Evans, 263), because ‘Indians 
should become acquainted with Western knowledge and the English language in 
order to assimilate themselves to their rulers’ (Clive 1973, cited in Evans, 263).  
Such measures did have some benefits for both the colonisers and the colonised 
intermediaries, who helped in the Administration of the Natives, but it did not stop 
decolonisation (Spivak 2010).  Similarly, strategies to instil British values amongst 
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Muslims may benefit those who are drawn into the counter-terrorism industry but the 
‘suspect’ community is not homogenous and therefore for many losses are likely to 
prevail (Duffield 2005).  
Policing (with) parents and families 
One of the other mechanisms for garnering support to counter-terrorism is to involve 
parents to police their children.  Mixed messages of holding parents responsible for 
their children’s behaviour and exhortation for them to be involved in changing this 
through engagement with (community) policing have prevailed and they resonate 
with other policy sites where parents have also borne the brunt of their children’s 
behaviour (Hickman et al. 2012).  For instance, in tackling truancy and anti-social 
behaviour punitive measures have seen parents been subjected to injunctions and 
imprisonment where children have not conformed to expected norms. These 
discourses, heavily reliant upon moral panics and the underclass thesis that parents 
wilfully perpetuate deviant, dependent cultures across generations (Murray 1996), 
are mirrored in interventions with parents in addressing extremism where the 
community and specifically parents  are held responsible for not doing enough to 
tackle terrorism within their families.    
Community policing in the CT context has included exhortations for parents to 
be vigilant in observing risky behaviours of their children and to engage with police.  
A part of the process is to skill parents with the necessary technological tools for 
detection.  Indeed, it was at the behest of police calls that Majida Sarwar reported to 
the police the return of her 22 year old son from Syria, but subsequently regretted 
doing so as she felt angry and betrayed when he received a sentence of 12 years 
imprisonment (McVeigh 2014). 
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Community policing, as an intelligence gathering strategy has a long history 
among minority communities (Bridges 1983; Sivanandan 1981) and is currently 
practiced in Europe to ensure urban security (Virta 2008); it is largely perceived to be 
positive in engaging and building trust with communities (Innes 2006) since it is 
difficult to stop crime without the help of neighbourhoods (Leichtman 2008, 69). From 
the experiences of parents who have reported their suspicion of radicalisation 
amongst their young, a deterioration of the extant distrust between the police and the 
parents is observable (Awan 2012b).  An over-emphasis on profiling to predict levels 
of risk, based on individual racial, ethnic or religious background and behaviour, 
complements this approach and it potentially targets innocent people.  
Community (policing) led campaigns to deter ‘jihadist tourism’ appeals 
specifically to Asian mothers to help the police and prevent their daughters going to 
Syria.  In July 2014, the Home Secretary launched the ‘Families Matter’ campaign 
aimed at dissuading young people to travel to Syria in support of Isis or the Syrian 
state. The solution for parents is to engage in a two-way conversation, to 
‘understand the risks children face’ and to ‘engage’ in a ‘frank, honest conversation 
about this complicated subject’ with their children to prevent them from going to 
terrorist hotspots (Pickering, McCulloch, and Wright-Neville 2008).  In so far as it is 
women who are the focus of attention here, it constitutes an ongoing effort to recruit 
women in resisting terrorism (Allen and Guru 2012).   The Web Guardians project 
teaches mothers how to use the web before they learn how to look at their children's 
internet history (Families Matter 2015).  Such measures are in contradiction with 
other government policies aimed at protecting young people and encouraging 
disobedience against forced marriages and honour killings.  Though both messages 
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are predicated on vilification of a suspect community, there is a potential danger here 
of confusing both children and parents at the same time as to which instruction of the 
law and scriptures they should follow (Sedqwick 2010). The mother-daughter 
relationship is especially invoked.  Police appealed to Asian mothers through adverts 
urging them to prevent their daughters from going to zones of conflict to become 
‘jihadee brides’ and to establish a dialogue with their daughters.  This explicitly 
assumed a special mother/daughter bond.  
We know that the strong bond between a mother and daughter can have a 
powerful influence on a young woman (Morris 2014).  
The advert announced that ‘The campaign recognises that it is mothers who often 
spot  changes in behaviour or signs someone may be considering travelling to a 
conflict that millions are desperate to escape’ (Weaver 2015).  The underlying 
assumption here characterise women as peacemakers, as opposed to violent 
Muslim men (Ewing 2008; Mythen, Walklate, and Khan 2009) and conciliatory 
agents and positions them as ‘apolitical’ beings hoping to appease militancy, which 
other methods could not reach.   It is an assumption that is countered by both the 
rise in young girls going to warzones as well as families as a whole, as recent cases 
such as Tareena Shakil and others charged with terrorism illustrate (McVeigh 2015).  
Moreover, in the views of the parents it was the inadequacies of the police to 
communicate information to them that prevented parents taking action to stop their 
children going.  Again, the intervention with families and into family life of the poor 
and ‘deviant’ is not new.  The notion of improper parental conduct as one of the 
primary causes of delinquent behaviour of children is rooted in the 19th century (The 
Report of Committee for Investigating the Causes of the Alarming Increase of 
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Juvenile Delinquency in the Metropolis (1816).  The troubled families discourse is 
transposed onto Prevent, deradicalisation strategies with explicit analogies drawn 
between families in difficulty, internet radicalisation and terrorism (Silber and Bhatt 
2007). 
The problematisation, pathologisation of Muslim communities and families 
resonates with media, law and the state discourses on muggers’ which represented 
black men as constituting a potent threat to society (Hall, et al. 1982).  It culminated 
in the criminalisation of the Black youth while neglecting wider socio-economic and 
political factors at play.  The moral panics and folk devils created in the process 
served to introduce social control measures that would otherwise have been less 
palatable and viable (Hall et al. 1982).  The Muslim, radicalised youth today are 
charting the same journey as their predecessors and the outcome is greater control 
and surveillance and the erosion of long fought for democratic rights. However, this 
is not the first time that such approaches have been used, they have historical 
echoes.  Many anti-colonial movements and armed resistances were quashed by 
colonial powers, suppressing dissidents, ‘cultures of resistance’ deemed ‘primitive’, 
‘oppressive’ and ‘dangerous’ because they threatened the power and ideology of the 
rulers.  To name a few, Native Americans, South Africans and Australian Aborigines 
bear witness  to such experiences, all of whom were acculturated, assimilated and 
integrated through process of being brainwashed and indoctrinated with the use of 
Christian principles, and whose anger and resistance was placated through a 
process not too dissimilar to that of Prevent and the Channel programmes.  
Kundnani (2012) notes that Sageman, one of key proponents rejecting economic 
and political issues in favour of friendship/kinship networks as pathways to 
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radicalisation, argues that governments should elicit the support of pro-western 
Muslim leaders to train and advise them on ‘political and cultural influences’ to 
engage and ‘battle for the soul of the community’.  This is not unlike the colonial 
narrative of recruiting the ‘native’ to rule in favour of the colonisers by ‘engrafting’ 
and departing to the traditional elite, western education to ‘enlighten’ them in order to 
create intermediaries between the British and the natives.  Lord Macaulay’s 1835 
Minute on introduction of English education in India resonates with the current 
initiatives to create intermediaries: 
We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters 
between us and the millions whom we govern – a class of persons Indian in 
blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect 
Macauley, quoted in Evans 2002, 271). 
The current insistence upon integration and entrenchment of ‘British values’ 
and of western ‘democracy’ in de-radicalisation effort reflects past colonial practices.  
The Prevent and the de-radicalisation industry, employing the third sector from the 
Muslim communities can be seen as a technique to facilitate the creation of a middle 
class (which otherwise may have been difficult to recruit/employ), which is equipped 
to control its own population (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010).  
Working with parents to counter-terrorism may or may not deliver the desired 
results with regards to building closer relationship with police, but the evidence for a 
similar relationship developing between the police and young people is thin, since 
many Muslim men in particular have little trust in the police or in Prevent (Innes, et 
al. 2011). Policies that erode democratic rights by leaving foreign fighters stateless 
or which criminalise them upon return, or which covertly and illegally occupy lands 
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and kill by drones those defined as imminent national threats, are likely to do little to 
instil confidence amongst the young people or their parents. Instead, they are likely 
to fuel the resolve of individuals and ISIS propaganda to intensify armed militancy 
(Heath-Kelly, Jarvis, and Baker-Beall 2014).    
The current means to elicit Muslim communities in countering terrorism draw 
on a longstanding tradition of pathologising parents and families whilst intruding on 
their privacy.  These devices are widely perceived by Muslim communities as 
measures of surveillance, control and repression. This study, amongst others 
(Poynting and Mason 2008; Mythen, Walklate, and Khan 2009; Walklate and Mythen 
2014) shows that Muslim feel they are being treated as folk devils, the ‘main enemy; 
they constitute a suspect community whilst being marginalised, stigmatised, 
alienated and having their civil liberties eroded’ (Kundnani 2012, 10).   
We argue that current counter-terrorism trends of changing the thoughts, 
attitudes and behaviours of particularly young Muslims resonate not only with 
historical colonial strategies of acculturating militant/disquieted subjects but also 
reflect family interventions in other policy areas such as poverty and anti-social 
behaviours in Troubled families, where similar initiatives have sought to blame 
families whilst eliciting their support to change alleged ‘problematic’ behaviours 
(Krueger 2002; Mandel 2009; Moghaddam 2005).   
It may be more worthwhile to see radicalisation not as a pathological state of 
being, but as a human, political response to perceived violent, repressive, often 
terrorising state practices.  On the other hand, if radicalisation is seen as a form of a 
political and politicisation process, it becomes possible to engage in an 
understanding of how in political conflict one party interprets and responds to the 
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actions of the other and how political negotiations and avenues might be possible. 
This, of course, would require political empowerment of Muslim communities, 
providing space for engagements in “radical, democratic alternatives to violent 
vanguardism and a rethinking of UK foreign policies and alliances” (Kundnani 2012, 
22).   
The Research Study 
The aim of this research project was to develop a better understanding of how 
Muslim parents view the current counter-terrorism policing strategy employed by 
West Midland’s police in relation to the crises in Syria.  Specifically, the objectives of 
this project were to; explore the current policing policy that exists around young 
people fighting abroad; examining the nature of support available to them and 
gathering the perceptions of Muslim parents in relation to such policies. This study 
utilized a qualitative approach in gathering the perceptions of Muslim parents with 
the use of focus groups. This foundation is informed by a social constructivist 
approach whereby focus is placed upon the voices of the participants and how they 
construct their practice within the context of individual agency, and the broader risk 
discourses and narratives within which they are located. The study involved four 
focus groups with twenty parents (ten fathers and ten mothers).   
Each group was split into five parents (five fathers and five mothers) and the 
focus groups were held at three different venues, including the central mosque, a 
community centre based in Washwood heath and the women’s centre in Sparkbrook.  
All the parents had children, whose ages varied from between 14-23 and the 
participants came from within different areas of Birmingham East, namely, 
Sparkbrook, Washwood Heath, Alum Rock, Sparkhill and Stechford.  Access was 
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negotiated through liaising with community members but also through contacts 
suggested by community members. Focus groups allowed the authors to obtain an 
overview as regards views and experiences of parents with respect to the current 
crises in Syria and also the implications of West Midlands Police policy to get 
parents to inform the police if they suspect there children may be at risk of travelling 
to Syria.   
The focus groups are situated in Birmingham and a number of factors should 
be considered with respect to events in Birmingham.  These include the Trojan 
Horse scandal where a number of teachers and governors were removed because of 
being accused of being involved in influencing the national curriculum with an 
Islamist ideology.  Other incidents such as Project Champion in 2010 in Birmingham 
where West Midlands Police used surveillance cameras to monitor Muslim 
communities without consultation reinforced the notion Muslim communities feel like 
a suspect community (Awan 2014; Isajkee and Allen 2013; Coafee and Fussey 
2015; Fussey 2013; Spalek 2011). 
Ethical approval was granted and ethical consideration involved all 
participants being able to withdraw their consent at any time and all participants were 
ensured confidentiality and anonymity throughout the research study.  The names of 
all participants have been changed in order to protect their anonymity. Recordings of 
the focus groups were transcribed and thematically analysed and each participant 
name has been replaced to ensure confidentiality (See Table 1 and 2). Clearly, in a 
short qualitative study such as the present one, there is an issue of doing further 
research with a larger sample size that would demonstrate a more representative 
view of the community.   
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Table 1 – Muslim Parents Interviewed – Fathers 
 
Focus 
Groups 
Parents Age Children Gender Ages Ethnicity 
1 Muhammed 
Zulfikhar 
48 5 3 Male 
2 
Female 
14-18 Pakistani 
1 Liaqat 
Hussain 
52 4 1 Male 
3 
Female 
13-23 Pakistani  
1 Yusuf Ali 46 4 2 Male 
2 
Female 
16-23 Pakistani 
1 Ali Raza 59 2 1 Male 
1 
Female 
23-25 Pakistani 
1 Muhammed 
Khan 
38 2 2 
Female 
4-6 Bangladeshi 
2 Jehangir 
Ayub 
46 5 4 Male 
1 
Female 
16-25 Afghanistan 
2 Wajid Ali 39 3 3 
Females 
6-12 Pakistani 
2 Zubair 
Wahid 
55 4 2 Male 
2 
Female 
10-19 Afghanistan 
2 Haider 
Khan 
35 2 1 Male 
1 
Female 
10-12 Pakistani  
2 Aqeel 
Hussain 
53 4 4 Male 13-22 Pakistani 
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Table 2 – Muslim Parents Interviewed – Mothers 
 
Focus 
Groups 
Parents Age Children Gender Ages Ethnicity 
3 Ayesha 
Khan 
55 3 Female 17-24 Pakistani 
3 Robina 
Hussain 
45 1 Female 19 Bangladeshi 
3 Samina 
Ali 
38 3 2 Male 
1 Female 
6-11 Pakistani 
3 Ruksana 
Begum 
67 5 2 Male 
3 Female 
26-37 Bangladeshi 
3 Mobina 
Khan 
43 3 3 Male 18-20 Pakistani 
4 Farzana 
Walid 
66 4 2 Male 
2 Female 
28-39 Pakistani 
4 Uzma 
Hussain 
48 2 1 Male 
1 Female 
19-26 Afghanistan 
4 Safina 
Begum 
55 4 4 Male 22-31 Pakistani 
4 Shabana 
Bibi 
33 1 Female 7 Bangladeshi 
4 Rifat 
Sultana 
42 2 1 Male 
1 Female 
18-22 Bangladeshi 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
Trust, the police and children  
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Since the terrorist attacks of July 7th 2005, the UK has been on high alert, thus 
making counter-terrorism policy shift towards tackling home-grown terrorism. Within 
this context, the police service and Muslim communities have had to work together in 
preventing extremism (Spalek and Lambert 2008; Spalek 2010).  The empirical data 
from the research study in this article, has found that Muslim community members 
(including parents) are increasingly finding this partnership with the police service 
problematic (Gordon and Rowe 2007; Bellamy 2006).  For a partnership to exist, 
there needs to be a level of trust and confidence between both parties. Badey (1998) 
argues that governmental definitions of terrorism are ambiguous and therefore the 
manner in which terrorism is defined can be subjective.   
The parents we spoke to were worried about the lack of support for Muslim families 
and they feared that anyone who had gone to Syria would be arrested and have their 
citizenship removed if they spoke out.  
They are worried and scared like most families would be (Farzana Walid). 
People are anxious but understand that we all are not like this and why would 
we be scared like that (Uzma Hussain). 
The study found that many parents also faced a difficult situation because of the 
personal moral dilemma they held, which might mean they would be alienating their 
own children by in effect giving the police information about them.  This they argued 
would be problematic if their children had committed no offences.  For example,’ 
Muhammed Zulfikhar, stated: 
I don’t trust the police so I would not tell them. I trust my children so why 
would I tell the police anything about them…  
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Yusuf Ali, added that:  
I would speak to him and me and my son have a good relationship and we get 
on well.  I don’t spy on him but agree as parents we should show our children 
the positive image of Islam and not fight with terrorists. My son trusts me.    
Vertigans (2010, 32) argues that: ‘‘Emotionally, individuals within communities under 
surveillance consider their values and behaviour to be under threat’’.  This does 
seem to resonate with the findings in our study that Muslims feel much more isolated 
from society as a result of police actions.   Uzma Hussain, said that: 
I would not call them because the police might just come knocking on my door 
and arrest my other children. Hard to trust them.  
Furthermore, Safina Begum argued that:  
No. I don’t see the point if I am honest. My child would not tell me if they were 
going to Syria and if they did I might think about it.   
Jehangir Ayub stated that:  
I would normally have told them (the police) and have done so in the past, but 
I don’t trust them at all.  This is the police making my children hate me.   
Booth (2008) argues that one way in determining whether someone may be 
choosing a path of radicalization is being able to identify ‘personality’ traits and 
therefore this can help tackle terrorist ideology.  In contrast, Chomsky (2002) argues 
that such tactics will inevitably lead to frustration and anger amongst minority 
communities who will perceive such policies as targeting them because of the way 
they look. 
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When asked would they report their child missing to the police, Haider Khan stated 
that: 
 …I don’t see the point because by then its’ too hard to get them back.   
Those views were echoed by Aqeel Hussain who stated that: 
No I would not report them to the police, because that’s not what parents do.  
We need to educate them not to travel there in the first place.  If I told the 
police they would then arrest me and my children.  
However, Muhammed Khan disagreed:   
I disagree, if your children and say my daughter was travelling to Syria I would 
contact the police because we need to bring them back.   
Issues of a lack of trust reappeared throughout the study as some parents felt this 
was a policing tactic used to target them and treat them as ‘suspects’.  Durodié 
(2007) argues that some people feel a sense of disgruntlement and therefore this 
leads to forms of alienation which results in people searching for a sense of identity 
and belonging. 
Ayesha Khan noted that:  
Project Champion was done on purpose to make us Muslims look like fools.  I 
mean that’s not what I call trust.   
The overall majority of responses in our study were negative and participants viewed 
the police with caution and a lack of trust.  Clearly, there are problems for the police 
when dealing with ethnic minorities; apart from police culture, there is a historical 
sense of mistrust (Virta 2008).  The central contradiction here appears to be that 
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parents are implicitly held to be responsible for the actions of their children by the 
police, yet the parents are adamant that the responsibility is not theirs and that they 
are relatively powerless.  In circumstances where the community lacks trust and 
confidence in the police, community policing is likely to be ineffective because it is 
viewed with suspicion.  Below the paper examines another central theme which 
emerged from our study in relation to methods of surveillance and rehabilitation.    
Surveillance, ‘Spying on Us’ and Rehabilitation 
The use of surveillance as a means to monitor what Muslim children are doing was 
also viewed in the prism of unnecessary surveillance. Sentry-dataveillant policing is 
associated with what Rigakos (2005, 283) calls ‘‘keeping watch’’ and is much more 
about monitoring people through surveillance, and is increasingly becoming less 
passive and more proactive in its use of technology as a vehicle for gathering 
information (O’Connor et al. 2008).  According to Hier and Greenberg (2009), 
surveillance has led to political and social problems within society, such as over-
policing, suspicion and fear (Dupont, 2004; Sheptycki, 1997).  In this section, we 
identify how Muslim parents feel that they are being spied upon in their homes.   
Parents don’t know if their children are going to Syria. So how can we report 
them? I am not sure what to look for? What are the signs? This just looks like 
spying (Ruksana Begum).  
Foucault (1981) argues that surveillance mechanisms can be controlled by 
procedural matters.  This could include the examination and exchange of 
communication and information which is used for specific purposes.  Haggerty and 
Ericson (2000) use the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari to analyse the 
convergence of discrete surveillance systems.  They argue that these are assembled 
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based on discrete data sets which include an intrusion of privacy.  There were a 
range of opinions from Muslim parents who felt that this form of surveillance would 
damage their personal relationship with their children.   
Wajid Ali, stated that:  
They need to stop interfering in our business because they are my kids and I 
will make sure they are not there. They have always arrested innocent people 
in my area and are looking for trouble sometimes when they see us Muslim.  
(Wajid Ali). 
Some of the parents also made the case that parents were being treated as a 
scapegoat for police incompetency.   
The police should stop bullying and spying on Muslims. Give us a break and if 
you want to stop children going there look at what you can do and not just 
parents (Samina Ali). 
Parents felt that this policy of ‘telling’ the police was merely a method of surveillance 
that the police we’re using in order to identify and prosecute individuals unfairly. 
Innes (2006) makes the case that policing requires an element of understanding 
community intelligence and democratic policing which means avoiding blanket 
surveillance which only fosters resentment and hatred.   
This is just another way of saying we need you to spy on your children.  So if 
they do go out and fight then we can blame you and not take any of the blame 
ourselves (Yusuf Ali). 
Critics argue that policing models have now been replaced by counter-terrorism-led 
policing initiatives that target Muslim communities (Virta 2008). Our study has found 
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that Muslim parents have a perception that such methods are a means of eliciting 
’key data’ and ‘information’ that could be used be used to unfairly ‘spy’ on them.   For 
example, Ayesha Khan stated that: 
 It’s all about cameras and using them to target Muslims. 
After addressing the issue of surveillance, a number of the participants also raised 
questions about rehabilitation, desistance and providing workable solutions in 
dealing with returnees from Syria.  Rehabilitation of foreign terrorist fighters involves 
a process of disengagement and de-radicalisation initiatives that use education and 
faith as a means to tackle the radicalisation process.  Such work can be drawn upon 
from the Denmark model, where fighters are provided with work based learning, job 
opportunities and provide talks to schools and colleges that can help dismantle the 
barriers.  Academics have argued that rehabilitation works alongside the concept of 
human rights and therefore those considerations should be taken into account when 
confronting the terrorist threat (Waldron 2004; Richardson 2006; Stohl 2008).  
Some of the participants did feel that more could be done to rehabilitate and work 
with those who have gone to Syria when they returned.  For example, Ayesha Khan 
said that:  
I think more charities and other groups of people need to help…  
Indeed, this perception about community work and rehabilitation stood out amongst 
many of the female participants who thought communities needed to do more.  
Robina Hussain, stated that:  
I think Imams need to play a role also and speak to youngsters to stop them 
going over to fight. This is not Jihad but stupidity.   
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When asked what Shabana meant specifically about rehabilitation, Shabana added 
that:  
I mean, helping clean the streets, coming out to schools, education courses, 
helping them get a job.  For me that’s all rehabilitation and we should not 
isolate these people because they are vulnerable.   
For Rifat Sultana, rehabilitation is about offenders understating they have made 
mistakes and helping them re-integrate back into society.  She stated that:  
They should know that they have made a mistake. But then they should be 
educated about the dangers of what they have done.   
Muhammed Khan felt that informal and formal control mechanisms would work.  He 
said that:  
I think we should create more safe spaces for these youngsters where they 
can say what they feel without someone saying you are a terrorist.  We should 
use sport activities with these youngsters so we can help them.   
Many participants felt that rehabilitation could work with vulnerable people whereby 
they work with different partners and are educated about the dangers of 
radicalisation as well as having help and support provided so they do not go back to 
fighting.   
We need to help these boys and girls find a job. If they are still in school then 
there parents also need to be educated.  (Wajid Ali). 
Similarly, Haider Khan noted that:  
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I mean what does rehabilitation mean? Some people say you can never be 
rehabilitated but I think if we don’t rehabilitate then these young people could 
turn out worse and become monsters.   
Conclusion 
One of the key government priorities in countering terrorism through Prevent has 
been to get parents, primarily mothers, to inform on their children.  Our study has 
found varying degrees of adherence to such requests and women certainly have 
displayed a more congenial attitude towards working with the police. However, given 
the size and the methodology of the study this cannot be claimed to have resonance 
in the wider Muslim communities, or to assume that women are more lenient than 
their male counterparts on these issues. Their voices are largely unheard and in fact 
are so suppressed, as the opposition of the National Union of Teachers to Prevent 
demonstrates, that it closes discourse and debate.  The closing of political spaces 
has created suspicion, fear and frustration where young people and adults 
encountering new ideas and beliefs feel unsafe to talk, discuss and be.  In this 
‘terrorism of prevention’, communication between families in these circumstances is 
likely to be fraught with tensions.   
Sons, daughters, brothers, sisters in a difficult position are unlikely to talk with 
their parents or others hence eliciting parental support is laden with difficulties.  
Against this backdrop community support, strategies to gain community support are 
tenuous. Meanwhile, real lives are endangered as returnee children and young 
people may be traumatised by the horrors of war they may have witnessed including 
beheadings, rape, sexual enslavement, and pillage. The UK has a duty of care 
towards these children and young people and yet talk of preventing their return and 
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upon return treating them as criminals, assumed guilty until proven innocent places 
them and the country at further potential risk.    
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